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This article seeks to analyse some mesoeconomic and
microeconomic aspects related with productivity and
international competitiveness in the context of the new Latin
American economic model. These aspects go a long way
towards explaining why those variables have not evolved
satisfactorily in the different countries and sectors of activity,
and why a strictly macroeconomic reading prevents a proper
understanding of the changes which are taking place in
society at the economic, technological and institutional
levels, as well as impeding the identification of a public
policy agenda which could help improve the implications
of the process of change which is under way.
Within this process, new patterns of micro-economic
behaviour have been taking shape in which imported capital
goods and intermediate imputs have been displacing locally
produced goods and the local technological efforts associated
with their production. This has been giving rise to a new
production organization model which is more closely linked
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I
Introduction
rates, investment and real wages– interact with others
of an institutional and technological nature –such as
property rights, the greater or lesser degree of
imperfection of factor markets, or the level of
technological capability attained by the different
countries– to give rise to a long-term growth process
which is far from satisfactory.
The ECLAC studies also show that, in addition to
being unsatisfactory in terms of growth rates and
microeconomic efficiency, the new Latin American
economic model does not exhibit any great achievement
in terms of equity either. Indeed, it is characterized by
profound structural heterogeneity which is in many
respects more marked than during the years of import
substitution industrialization. Some economic activities,
regions, or even individual economic agents within
each production sector have managed to adapt better
–through imperfect access to factor markets,
asymmetries of information or greater political lobbying
power– to the new rules of the game, but others have
not been able to do so. The former have cashed in on
the new opportunities opened up by the change in the
global system of incentives prevailing in society,
whereas the situation of the latter has tended to
deteriorate with time, and they have lost relative
participation in the production structure or have even
disappeared from it altogether. The process of structural
change which is under way is also marked by a sharp
increase in the degree of economic concentration and
the consolidation of new monopoly positions in the
production apparatus, within a context where the State
has lost regulatory power and the capacity to intervene.
The present article aims to analyse various
macroeconomic and microeconomic aspects relating to
productivity and international competitiveness. We will
argue that both these aspects play an important –and
often forgotten– role in explaining why the latter
variables have not evolved satisfactorily in the different
countries and sectors of activity and why a strictly
macroeconomic reading inhibits our capacity to
understand the changes taking place in society at the
production, technological and institutional levels, as
well as preventing the identification of a public policy
agenda which could help improve the implications of
the transformation under way. If the diagnosis is
In line with the principle of “appreciative theorizing”
(Nelson, 1997), in several recent studies ECLAC has
described various stylized features of the new model
of social and production organization that has been
taking shape in the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean after the structural reforms of the 1990s
which were designed to improve competitiveness.1
It is noted in these studies that the transition from
a paradigm of inward-looking development led by the
State to another, more open and deregulated, paradigm
–in which the “hidden hand”takes on a leading role
and guides resource allocation– has been giving rise in
the various countries of the region to the development
of new patterns of production specialization and
insertion in the world markets for goods and services.
This has taken place in the context of a prolonged
episode of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” in
which one model of production organization and
institutional and technological behaviour has been
gradually displaced by another, through the joint and
interdependent action of economic, technological and
institutional forces. The interdependence of
macroeconomic and microeconomic factors clearly
occupies a central place in this situation. The macro
economy –uncertain and subject to cyclical fluctuations
largely due to the erratic behaviour of international
capital markets– induces defensive forms of
microeconomic behaviour which, in turn, feed the
climate of feeble global dynamism, with improvements
in productivity and international competitiveness which
are lower than those registered in other parts of the
world. This is what prevents the countries of the region
from closing the relative productivity and income gap
that separates them from the industrialized world. In a
macro economy that is unable to overcome its high
degree of uncertainty and risk, improvements in
productivity at the microeconomic level are achieved
more through the dismissal of workers from relatively
“old” plants than through major programmes of
investment and technological modernization. Strictly
economic variables –such as the exchange rate, interest
1
 Stallings and Peres (2000), World Development (2000), Katz
(2000), Moguillansky and Bielschowsky (2000), Weller (2000),
Ffrench-Davis (1999) and Ocampo (2001).
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exclusively macroeconomic, we can hardly be surprised
that the dominant agenda limits itself to recommending
“more of the same”: i.e., further increasing trade
openness, continuing to deregulate markets, and
finishing off the privatization of everything which has
not yet been privatized.
This article consists of four sections. After this
introduction, section II compares the global
performance of the region during the inward-looking
growth stage (1940-1980) with the performance of the
1990s, when the Latin American countries opted for
a growth strategy more open to outside competition,
more deregulated and with less State participation in
production activities. The overall regional pattern,
however, does not describe the different national cases
accurately, so after presenting the global panorama
we move on to analyse the differences in performance
between individual countries and production activities,
focusing in particular on indicators of labour
productivity and revealed international
competitiveness.
In section III we make a tentative simple effort at
appreciative theorization on this process. Our reading
of it is based on the Schumpeterian notion of “creative
destruction”. We argue that sectoral technological and
competitive regimes change through the “death” and
“birth” of firms, through the arrival of new international
actors, and through the aggiornamento of each
production sector’s institutions,2 technologies, and rules
of behaviour. We are in the presence of a process of
long-term structural transformation which economists
are still far from fully understanding. Finally, section




1. The overall picture
The numbers in table 1 explain the great scepticism
currently prevailing about the effects of the reforms of
the 1990s. The information is condensed into four
specific dimensions: i) the behaviour of the macro
economy, reflected in the rate of inflation of the region
as a whole; ii) the performance of the external sector,
summed up by the aggregate growth rates of imports
and exports; iii) the functioning of the production
structure, represented by the growth rates of the gross
domestic product and labour productivity, and
iv) equity, represented by an index of poor households
as a proportion of total population.
The pattern of successes and failures is obvious.
The region has made a lot of progress in handling
macroeconomic policy. The rate of inflation, indicates
that the performance of the Latin American economies
improved considerably in the 1990s. The Latin
American countries were also more open to trade than
in previous decades. The growth rate of imports was
higher than that of exports, however, suggesting that
the region’s openness to trade was greater for imports
than for exports. This suggests a certain degree of
vulnerability in the external sector of the new Latin
American economic model, to which the governments
of the region are now paying increasing attention.3 We
will return to this subject later in this article. At the
same time, however, we must also bear in mind that
the averages shown in the table are strongly influenced
by Mexico, which managed to double total exports in
the 1990s thanks to the rapid expansion of its in-bond
2
 The term “institutions” is used by economists rather ambiguously
to refer both to agencies or entities –banks, universities, customs
systems– and to norms of conduct or rules of behaviour. Thus, the
patents system is an “institution”, as also is tariff protection. With
regard to this debate, see David (1994).
3
 In a recent study on Brazilian exports, Miranda (2000) argues
that it is not only urgent to increase exports but will probably also
be urgent in the future to begin to substitute imports once again in
sectors of production which make intensive use of imported
intermediate inputs –such as capital goods, electronic products or
pharmaceutical raw materials– and which are largely responsible
for the big external trade deficits currently registered by a number
of economies of the region. A similar debate is currently under
way in Argentina. In many respects this recalls the old  ECLAC
debates of the 1950 on the chronic external constraints affecting
many Latin American economies. We will return to this subject
later in this article (see Miranda, 2000).
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TABLE 1
Global performance of Latin America during the import substitution
industrialization period and the 1990s
(Percentages)
1945-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000
Annual rate of inflation 20 400 170.0 9.2
Growth rate of exports 2.1 4.4 9.4 11.1
Growth rate of imports 5.9 -0.8 12.8 12.3
Growth rate of GDP 5.6 1.2 3.3 4.3
Growth rate of per capita GDP 3.1 -1.8 1.6 2.2
Percentage of poor households 35 41 38 38
Source: ECLAC, 2000.
FIGURE 1




• Peru • Panama
• Argentina
• El Salvador
• Costa Rica• Guatemala
• Bolivia
• Nicaragua
Uruguay • • Honduras • Mexico
• Colombia • Brazil
• Paraguay •















2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8%
assembly industry, which supplies the United States
market with television sets, video recorders, computers
and vehicles.4
The growth and equity performance of the region,
however, seems less satisfactory if we look at the
indicators for production, labour productivity and
percentage of “poor” households in total population,
which do not on the whole display any long-term
improvement, except in comparison with the “lost
decade” of the 1980s.
2. Differences between countries
There are very few countries in the region which grew
faster during the 1990s than in their import substitution
industrialization stage and which improved on their
historical GDP growth rate. In fact, only Chile,
Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay did so (figure 1). In
all the other countries their performance in the 1990s
was clearly worse, especially in the case of the two
largest economies of the region –Brazil and Mexico–
which only recovered a higher growth rate towards the
end of the decade, although such growth rate was still
below that of the 1970s.
A similar pattern –big differences between the
performance of individual countries– is seen when we
4
 Within only a few years Mexico has risen from US$ 60 billion of
exports to over US$ 150 billion; a little less than half of this figure
corresponds to in-bond assembly production for the United States
market. This situation has currently given rise to a far-reaching
debate among analysts of the Mexican model on the amount of
local added value and the development of local engineering capacity
attributable to the growth of the in-bond assembly industry (see
Buitelaar, Padilla and Urrutia, 1999; Gerber, 2000; Dussel, 2000a;
Cimoli, 2001).
compare the indicators of revealed international
competitiveness.
The aggregate information shows that the region
as a whole has not significantly improved in terms of
penetration of world markets. Thus, Latin America
generated 5.57% of total world trade in 1985, and this
figure had only risen to 5.67% by 1998. Even so, a few
countries did manage to gain relatively larger shares of
world trade flows during the period in question. This
was especially so in the case of Mexico, whose share
of total world imports rose from 1.55% to 2.24%
between those years. To a much smaller extent, this
was also the case of Argentina and Chile, which rose
respectively from 0.37% and 0.23% of world imports
in 1985 to 0.51% and 0.32% in 1998. Marginal
increases were registered by Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic,
whose shares grew much less (table 2).
1945-1980
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TABLE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Market share in world imports, 1985-1998
Country Market share
1985 1998 Difference
Argentina 0.37 0.51 0.14
Chile 0.23 0.32 0.09
Mexico 1.55 2.24 0.69
Costa Rica 0.07 0.10 0.03
El Salvador 0.04 0.05 0.01
Guatemala 0.06 0.08 0.02
Honduras 0.05 0.07 0.02
Dominican Republic 0.08 0.10 0.02
Bolivia 0.04 0.02 -0.02
Brazil 1.37 1.01 -0.36
Colombia 0.24 0.24 0.00
Ecuador 0.17 0.11 -0.06
Paraguay 0.03 0.03 0.00
Peru 0.17 0.12 -0.05
Uruguay 0.07 0.06 -0.01
Venezuela 0.66 0.41 -0.25
Nicaragua 0.02 0.02 0.00
Barbados 0.02 0.00 -0.02
Cuba 0.03 0.02 -0.01
Haiti 0.03 0.01 -0.02
Jamaica 0.04 0.04 0.00
Trinidad and Tobago 0.10 0.04 -0.06
Guyana 0.02 0.01 -0.01
Panama 0.10 0.05 -0.05
Suriname 0.02 0.01 -0.01
Source: CAN 2000 (Competitive analysis of nations, 2000 version):
a computer programme prepared by the Industrial and
Technological Development Unit, Division of Production,
Productivity and Management, ECLAC.
In other words, regardless of whether we look at
output and labour productivity statistics or at trade
indicators which reflect revealed competitiveness, it is
clear that at the aggregate level Latin America registered
little improvement in the 1990s. Only a few countries
of the region managed to improve on their previous
performance. Furthermore, the two sets of data show
that there is not always a good level of correlation
between the two indicators. In the case of Mexico, for
example, the success obtained in the field of revealed
competitiveness contrasts sharply with its unsatisfactory
showing in terms of labour productivity (figure 2).
Export-led growth does not always seem to be as
automatic as is often assumed in current debates on
growth.
3. Sectoral patterns of production specialization
and world trade insertion: sectoral catching-up
and lagging behind
Production and productivity statistics on the one hand
and international trade figures on the other enable us
to continue to progress in analysing and describing the
restructuring of the production apparatus after the recent
structural reforms. Our indicators clearly show that in
the 1990s two main dominant production and trade
specialization models became established in Latin
America.
The first of these models is characteristic of the
Southern Cone countries (Chile, Argentina, Brazil) and
some Andean countries (Colombia and Peru), and
shows a clear leaning towards activities that involve
the processing of natural resources to produce industrial
commodities such as vegetable oils, pulp and paper,
iron and steel, fish meal, etc. From the point of view of
the organization of production, these are industries that
make intensive use of natural resources and produce
goods in highly automated plants, using a great deal of
capital and little labour. From the point of view of
international trade, they are production sectors where
world demand grows slowly and price- and income-
elasticity are low. Finally, from the technological angle
they may be described as mature industries where there
are no great engineering efforts in the design of new
products, although efforts are made to improve
production processes and the organization of production
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a In all cases the petroleum refining sector (ISIC 353) has been
excluded. In the case of Chile, industrial production of copper
(ISIC 372) has also been excluded.
b The corresponding sectors are:
01 Sectors making intensive use of engineering services, except
the motor industry (ISIC 381, 382, 383, 385).
02 Motor industry (ISIC 384).
03 Total for sectors making intensive use of engineering services
(01 + 02).
TABLE 3
Latin America (six countries): Structure of industrial added valuea
(Percentage composition)
Argentina Brazil Mexico
Sectorsb 1970 1980 1990 1999 1970 1980 1990 1999 1970 1980 1990 1999
01 13.2 13.4 8.8 10.8 16.2 25.0 22.0 24.0 12.0 14.9 13.7 15.7
02 10.9 13.1 6.4 9.9 6.8 8.7 7.6 7.6 8.4 12.4 12.9 16.4
03 24.1 26.5 15.3 20.6 23.0 33.7 29.6 31.6 20.5 27.3 26.7 32.1
04 33.5 32.5 40.6 38.3 14.5 13.1 16.1 17.4 26.1 21.8 22.7 22.0
05 18.3 20.8 24.0 20.2 29.2 26.7 26.1 27.4 23.3 24.9 25.5 23.2
06 51.8 53.4 64.6 58.5 43.7 39.9 42.2 44.9 49.4 46.7 48.2 45.1
07 24.0 20.1 20.2 20.9 33.4 26.4 28.2 23.5 30.2 26.0 25.1 22.8
08 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Chile Colombia Peru
Sectorsb 1970 1980 1990 1999 1970 1980 1990 1999 1970 1980 1990 1999
01 15.9 10.4 10.8 11.9 12.3 11.1 9.7 9.7 5.7 9.9 6.2 4.7
02 7.7 3.4 2.3 1.9 3.0 4.2 3.6 6.3 6.5 8.6 5.3 0.9
03 23.6 13.8 13.1 13.8 15.3 15.3 13.2 16.0 12.1 18.5 11.5 5.6
04 24.4 33.9 33.5 36.2 31.3 32.7 32.6 33.1 34.1 25.6 31.7 26.8
05 21.0 23.7 25.8 24.9 18.9 20.1 24.1 22.3 19.4 25.0 26.0 31.1
06 45.4 57.5 59.4 61.2 50.2 52.7 56.7 55.3 53.5 50.7 57.7 57.8
07 31.0 28.7 27.5 25.0 34.5 32.0 30.1 28.7 34.4 30.8 30.8 36.6
08 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: PADI (Industrial Dynamics Analysis Programme): a computer programme prepared by the Industrial and Technological Development
Unit, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, ECLAC.
04 Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 311, 313, 314).
05 Other sectors making intensive use of natural resources (ISIC
331, 341, 351, 354, 355, 362, 369, 371, 372).
06 Total for sectors making intensive use of natural resources
(04 + 05).
07 Sectors making intensive use of labour (ISIC 321, 322, 323,
324, 332, 342, 352, 356, 361, 390).
08 Total for manufacturing.
The case of Mexico and a number of the smaller
Central American countries is different. Here, the
pattern of production specialization has gradually been
moving towards greater relative participation of the
assembly of electronic equipment, computers and
clothing, mainly for the United States market. Some of
these industries have operated under the maquila
system, based almost entirely on imported intermediate
inputs (Dussel, 2000b; Buitelaar, 1999). All of them
make intensive use of unskilled labour. The Mexican
assembly industry generated over a million new jobs
in the 1990s. Using “state of the art” technology and
sophisticated just-in-time supply logistics for parts and
components, as well as total quality techniques brought
over almost integrally from the respective parent firms,5
but paying wages which are only a fraction –not much
than 10%– of those paid by developed countries, those
assembly plants exclusively cater  for the United States
domestic market. Demand on that market grew very
rapidly in the 1990s, and both product design (which
is not done in the region) and brand names play an
important role in a context of imperfectly competitive
markets.
Table 3 shows that the relative weight of resource-
processing industries and foodstuffs grew significantly
in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru between 1970
5
 On recent visits to plants in the Tijuana area it was noted that,
while some assembly firms have in-plant engineering groups or
departments for making process or organizational improvements,
others –including nearby competitors– do not have them. This
obviously affects the comparative competitiveness of the firms.
Sanyo and Samsung, for example, have very different strategies in
this respect, although they are long-standing competitors in the
United States television market.
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TABLE 4
Mexico: Aspects of its international competitiveness
in world imports, 1985-1998
1985 1990 1995 1998
I. Market share 1.55 1.29 1.73 2.24
Natural resourcesa 3.59 2.38 2.05 2.26
Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 0.82 0.67 0.79 0.96
Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 0.96 1.18 1.89 2.53
– Low technologyd 0.59 0.82 1.41 2.12
– Medium technologye 0.98 1.33 2.22 2.81
– High technologyf 1.33 1.27 1.77 2.44
Othersg 1.31 1.51 1.82 2.25
II. Structure of exports 100 100 100 100
Natural resourcesa 53.5 29.3 15.8 12.4
Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 10.3 9.2 7.6 6.8
Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 33.5 57.5 73.0 77.2
– Low technologyd 5.4 10.6 13.6 15.7
– Medium technologye 18.1 32.0 40.0 38.9
– High technologyf 10.0 15.0 19.4 22.7
Othersg 2.6 3.9 3.6 3.6
III. 10 main exports, by relative shares 58.8 48.1 46.5 46.0
781 Passenger motor cars 0.8 5.9 9.7 9.4
333 Petroleum oils, crude 42.0 19.3 9.3 7.3
773 Equipment for distributing electricity 2.4 4.4 4.8 4.8
761 Television receivers 0.5 2.4 3.5 4.0
764 Telecommunications equipment and parts thereof 3.3 3.0 3.7 3.8
752 Automatic data processing machines and units thereof 0.2 1.7 2.4 3.8
782 Motor vehicles for the transport of goods or materials 0.5 0.6 2.8 3.6
784 Motor vehicle parts and accessories 2.6 4.1 3.8 3.5
931 Special transactions and commodities not classified according to kind 2.1 3.4 3.2 3.3
713 Internal combustion piston engines and parts thereof 4.4 3.4 3.2 2.5
Source: CAN 2000 computer programme. The groups of goods are based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev. 2).
a Contains 45 simply processed commodities, including concentrates.
b Contains 65 elements: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mainly metals –except iron and steel–, petroleum products, cement,
glass, etc.).
c Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Contains 44 elements: 20 groups from the textiles and clothing division plus 24 others (paper products, glass, iron and steel, jewellery).
e Contains 58 elements: 5 groups from the motor industry, 22 from the processing industry and 31 from the engineering industry.
f Contains 18 elements: 11 groups from the electronics division plus 7 from pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments.
g Contains 9 groups of items not elsewhere classified (mostly from section 9).
and the end of the 1990s, and in Brazil during the 1980s
and 1990s. The table also shows, however, that this was
not the case in Mexico. The motor industry was a
“winner” during the 1990s in Argentina and Brazil,6
and from the 1970s on in Mexico. Industries producing
wage goods such as footwear, textiles and furniture lost
relative ground. That was also the case –particularly in
Argentina and even more so in Chile and Peru– with
industries producing capital goods, agricultural
equipment and other engineering-intensive activities.
Complementing the foregoing, but this time from
the point of view of trade statistics, tables 4 and 5 show
the different patterns of production and trade
specialization established by Mexico and Argentina
6
 In Argentina and Brazil the percentage shares of the motor industry
were a good deal greater in 1997 and 1998 than in 1999. In
Argentina this share was 12.5% in 1998, while in Brazil it was
8.0% in 1997. The fall in domestic demand in those countries in
the later years of the 1990s was reflected in a marked increase in
idle capacity in this sector, so that the data for 1999 in table 3 do
not properly reflect the major investment effort made by the motor
industry in the 1990s.
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TABLE 5
Argentina: Aspects of its international competitiveness
in world imports, 1985-1998
1985 1990 1995 1998
I. Market share 0.37 0.36 0.44 0.51
Natural resourcesa 0.91 1.05 1.59 1.94
Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 0.47 0.55 0.64 0.69
Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.23
– Low technologyd 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.27
– Medium technologye 0.08 0.14 0.20 0.32
– High technologyf 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05
Othersg 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.14
II. Structure of exports 100 100 100 100
Natural resourcesa 56.7 45.8 48.0 47.0
Manufactures based on natural resourcesb 24.8 26.9 24.0 21.6
Manufactures not based on natural resourcesc 17.7 26.4 26.8 30.4
– Low technologyd 9.0 11.9 10.6 8.7
– Medium technologye 6.2 12.2 14.4 19.6
– High technologyf 2.5 2.3 1.9 2.2
Othersg 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.0
III. 10 main exports, by relative shares 43.7 34.4 44.1 51.7
081  Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) 10.5 8.7 9.0 8.9
333  Petroleum oils, crude 0.7 1.2 8.8 7.9
423  Fixed vegetable oils 5.6 4.7 6.5 6.6
781  Passenger motor cars 0.2 0.3 2.2 6.1
041  Wheat (including spelt) and meslin, unmilled 5.2 3.0 2.2 5.1
044  Maize (corn), unmilled 7.1 2.1 3.6 5.0
611  Leather 4.8 4.1 4.0 3.4
334  Petroleum products, refined 4.9 4.1 2.5 3.2
782  Motor vehicles for the transport of goods or materials 0.1 0.1 1.4 2.8
011  Meat and edible meat offals, fresh, chilled or frozen 4.8 6.2 4.1 2.8
Source: CAN 2000 computer programme. The groups of goods are based on the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev. 2).
a Contains 45 simply processed commodities, including concentrates.
b Contains 65 elements: 35 agricultural/forestry groups and 30 others (mainly metals –except iron and steel–, petroleum products, cement,
glass, etc.).
c Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d Contains 44 elements: 20 groups from the textiles and clothing division plus 24 others (paper products, glass, iron and steel, jewellery).
e Contains 58 elements: 5 groups from the motor industry, 22 from the processing industry and 31 from the engineering industry.
f Contains 18 elements: 11 groups from the electronics division plus 7 from pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments.
g Contains 9 groups of items not elsewhere classified (mostly from section 9).
over time. Mexico clearly subscribed to a model led by
the exports of metal products and machinery sectors to
the rapidly growing United States market. Argentina
on the other hand –if we except its motor industry,
which grew strongly within the framework of a highly
subsidized policy– tended to concentrate on resource
processing (industrial commodities).
In short, not only were there few countries of the
region which were able to improve their international
competitiveness in the 1990s, but those that did were
only able to do so in a very limited number of
production activities. These comprised predominantly,
on the one hand, assembly industries making intensive
use of unskilled labour, and on the other, industries
processing natural resources. The former quite
accurately reflects the situation of Mexico and several
of the smaller Central American countries, while the
latter represent the case of southern countries such as
Argentina, Chile, Brazil or Uruguay.
There was also an appreciable improvement in the
productivity and international trade insertion of the
motor industry –and in the case of Brazil of the aircraft
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industry too–,7 which received preferential treatment
from the economic authorities.
Another fundamental feature of the process we
are describing concerns the nature of the economic
agents which have led the processes of change. In
the maquila model, transnational enterprises
predominate, and there are few large domestic
conglomerates which have managed to incorporate
themselves into the process as suppliers of parts or
intermediate inputs (Mortimore and Peres, 2001;
Garrido, 2000; Kulfas, 2000).8 In the case of the
growth model based on the processing of natural
resources, in contrast, it is big local conglomerates
which have played a leading role. In both scenarios,
small and medium-sized locally owned enterprises,
on the one hand, and the group of State firms, on the
other, lost relative participation in recent years.9 Once
again, it is a question of dominant trends: examples
can be found of transnational corporations which
have specialized in the processing of natural
resources and of countries where small and medium
sized enterprises as a whole have not significantly
lost (or have even marginally improved) their share
in GDP (Peres and Stumpo, 2000).
4. The relative productivity gap
Let us begin by looking at the aggregate performance
of the manufacturing sector of various countries of the
region in comparison with that of the United States in
the period 1970-1998 and in various sub-periods of this
two-decade-long global stretch of time.
Before embarking on the analysis of the indicators
contained in table 6 it is important to keep in mind that
the United States economy, which is used here as a
benchmark for evaluating the evolution of the labour
productivity of the Latin American countries, grew
faster in the 1990s than its historical rate.
The figures in table 6 show that between 1970 and
1998 no country of the region reached growth rates of
industrial labour productivity which were higher than
those of the United States manufacturing sector.10
Consequently, not only was the disparity quite large in
absolute terms to begin with but we also found a long-
term tendency towards a widening of the productivity
gap.
It may be seen from table 7 that all the countries
under examination show lower levels of relative
productivity in 1998 (compared with the United States)
than in 1970. Here too, however, there are differences
between countries: the relative loss of ground was
clearly smaller in the case of Brazil and, above all,
Argentina. These two countries (together with Uruguay
up to 1996) are the only ones which showed a clear
tendency to narrow the productivity gap during the
1990s. As already noted, however, even in these cases
the growth in relative productivity was not enough to
regain the values of the early 1970s and to make up for
the serious loss of ground suffered in this respect in the
1980s. It should also be noted that –at least in
Argentina– the reduction in the relative productivity
gap in the 1990s was due essentially to the restructuring
of enterprises and the closure of less competitive firms
rather than to a generalized trend towards new
investments in industry.
This suggests that the structural reforms favouring
competitiveness induced a certain amount of
transformation of the production structure, but did not
succeed in bringing labour productivity in
manufacturing closer to that of the corresponding
sector in the United States.
Figure 3 shows that the reduction in the relative
labour productivity gap has tended to be greater in the
motor industry (which received preferential treatment
from the economic authorities in all the countries
considered) and in the industrial sectors processing
natural resources, especially those producing pulp and
paper, chemical and petrochemical products and non-
ferrous metals (i.e., the branches identified in the figure
as “Other N.R.”).
In contrast to the above, the industrial activities
making heavy use of unskilled labour and catering for
the local markets, producing footwear, clothing,
7
 In this respect, it is worth analysing in detail the case of Embraer,
which is currently the leading Brazilian exporter of manufactures,
has gone through various stages of evolution in its links with the
Brazilian public sector, has given evidence of a notable long-term
process of accumulation of its own technological capabilities which
has served as the basis for its present export success (see Goldstein,
2000).
8
 An interesting debate is currently under way on the degree to
which the great Mexican economic groups have managed to enter
the first “ring” of suppliers of Mexican automobile assembly firms:
something which does not seem to have been accomplished by
local auto parts suppliers in Argentina or Brazil, where takeovers
of such firms by big transnational corporations have become a
byword in recent years (see Brown, 2000).
9
 The available figures show a wide variety of situations among the
different countries, however (see Peres and Stumpo, 2000).
10
 The country which came closest to this was Argentina, with an
average annual growth rate of 3.7%, as compared with 3.9% in the
United States.
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TABLE 6
Production, employment and labour productivity
in Latin American manufacturing, 1970-1990 and 1990-1998
(Annual average growth rates)
Production Employment Productivity
1970-1990 1990-1998 1970-1990 1990-1998 1970-1990 1990-1998
Argentina -0.3 5.2 -2.3 -2.5 2.0 7.9
Bolivia 2.1 3.9 2.6 4.1 -0.5 -0.1
Brazil 4.4 0.1 3.2 -5.9 1.2 6.4
Chile 1.8 4.8 0.4 0.3 1.4 4.4
Colombia 3.6 1.5 1.8 -1.8 1.8 3.3
Costa Rica 4.8 4.2 8.0 1.8 -2.9 2.0
Ecuador 4.5 4.0 4.4 2.9 0.1 2.7
El Salvador -0.3 5.8 -1.8 ... 1.8 ...
Honduras 4.6 4.2 4.9 ... -0.4 ...
Mexico 4.1 3.7 2.1 1.0 1.9 2.7
Panama 1.6 4.7 2.6 0.5 -1.0 4.2
Peru 0.7 4.4 3.1 2.0 -2.4 3.1
Uruguay 1.1 0.7 3.0 -8.0 -1.8 8.2
Venezuela 3.5 2.7 3.8 -1.0 -0.3 4.8
United States 3.5 4.3 -0.2 -0.2 3.7 4.5
Source: The PADI computer programme.
TABLE 7
Latin America: Relative labour productivity of industry
compared with the United States manufacturing sector
1970 1980 1990 1998
Argentina 50.2 46.6 36.4 46.9
Brazil 35.4 28.3 21.7 25.0
Chile 46.2 42.2 29.5 29.3
Colombia 40.1 30.7 27.3 24.8
Costa Ricaa – – 15.0 13.8
Jamaicaa 28.0 16.5 9.3 8.8
Mexico 28.7 25.5 20.3 17.6
Perub 40.4 30.0 1.9 11.4
Uruguayc 43.0 21.7 1.7 17.3
Source:  The PADI computer programme.
a
 Data up to 1992.   b Data up to 1996.   c Data up to 1995.
that the “winning” sectors, i.e., those which managed
to come somewhat closer to the international
productivity frontier, were those which were favoured
by industrial policy, which benefitted from intra-
regional trade agreements, or which fitted in with the
pattern of “natural” comparative advantages of the
region. These three manufacturing categories currently
make up the new production specialization pattern of
the various Latin American countries. In contrast, the
industries making intensive use of technological know-
how and spending money on research and development
have clearly lagged behind, as so also have, to a lesser
extent, the industries making intensive use of labour to
produce wage goods for the domestic market. While
the latter industries have more and more difficulty in
competing with imports from labour-surplus countries,
the former have the same problem with imports from
technologically more mature economies.
To sum up, the sectors which are doing better in
relative terms are: i) the industrial sectors which have
received preferential treatment from economic
authorities; ii) assembly industries producing for the
United States market; and iii) industries processing
natural resources and enjoying static comparative
advantages. In contrast, those which have lost relative
ground internationally are: i) industrial branches
making intensive use of knowledge, and ii) those
making intensive use of unskilled labour producing
wage goods for the domestic market, which in the
furniture, etc., turned in a poorer relative performance
and were unable to withstand the competition of China.
A particularly poor performance was registered by the
activities making intensive use of engineering services
and engaging in research and development activities
(capital goods, the electronics industry, scientific
instruments). These activities faced a massive increase
in imports, facilitated by the greater external trade
openness, and have clearly lost ground with respect to
the international technological frontier.
In other words, what happened as regards the
relative labour productivity gap in the 1990s confirms
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present circumstances can hardly face the competition
from Chinese firms.
What types of firms tend to predominate in the
“winning” and “losing” sectors? Local subsidiaries of
foreign corporations and big locally owned
conglomerates predominate in the first group, while
small and medium-sized family-owned firms are typical
members of the “losing” set.
Figure 3 shows another fact of considerable
interest: only the motor industry is now closer to the
international technological frontier than it was twenty
years earlier, in the early 1980s. This enables us to gain
an idea of the enormous amount of ground the region
lost through the debt crisis and subsequently throughout
the 1980s. If we also take into account the crucial role
played by industrial policy in the revitalization of the
motor industry, we cannot fail to be struck by the
dubious capacity of conventional market mechanisms
to further the growth of the sectors with the greatest
content of technological knowledge and domestic added
value.
This is a serious conclusion to reach, to be sure,
because it questions much of the conventional wisdom
of the more orthodox sectors of our profession.
Nevertheless, we believe that the results set forth here
give a fairly credible picture of what has happened in
the industrial sector of Latin America in recent years,
and they will undoubtedly be useful when considering
public policy matters, as we will do later in this article.
The results presented so far also clearly show that
there are great differences among industries and types
of enterprises in terms of their pattern of adaptation to
the new rules of the game. It is precisely this observation
which suggests that we should progress to the meso-
economic and microeconomic aspects of the present
structural transformation if we wish to understand more
fully what has happened in recent years in Latin
America. The transition to a more open and deregulated
industrial organization model has been accompanied
by many changes in what we have called here the
technological and institutional “regimes” of each
activity.
FIGURE 3
Relative labour productivity gap compared
with United States manufacturing sector
Industries making Motor industry Other natural resource-
intensive use of based industries
engineering services
Total, natural resource- Industries making Total, manufacturing
based industries intensive use of labour sector
Source:  The PADI computer programme.
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III
Meso-economic and microeconomic aspects
of the structural change process
interested in analysing here are the changes that took
place within Latin American countries.
Let us take the case of Argentina, for example. We
know that the Argentine steel industry underwent a
major restructuring process –including the privatization
of a large State-owned steelworks– during the 1980s
and 1990s. This process involved: i) “births” and
“deaths” of enterprises; ii) changes in the institutional
fabric of the sector; and iii) the transnationalization of
the industry or, in other words, its generalized
orientation towards the external sector not only in terms
of imports and exports but also in terms of foreign direct
investment and its gradual insertion in the community
of international “global players”. All this was reflected
in a period of profound structural changes and the
gradual construction of a new competitive regime which
is certainly very different from that prevailing during
the import substitution industrialization period.
Of the 59 industrial steelworks that Argentina had
in 1975, only 26 were still operating in the 1990s. The
State-owned plant –Somisa S.A.– had been acquired,
partially dismantled and rehabilitated by Techint S.A.,
one of the two large locally-owned conglomerates that
currently control the industry. In a rapid
internationalization programme, that same group had
also acquired Tamsa in Mexico and Sidor in Venezuela,
as well as other firms, while at the same time it formed
strategic alliances with big European steelmaking
groups in order to gain control of the State-owned
steelworks privatized by the Italian government. In
other words, in spite of the vicissitudes of the Argentine
macroeconomic picture and the fall in investment
suffered by that country in the 1980s, Techint S.A.
carried through a major internationalization process in
the 1980s and set itself up as a “global player” on the
world scene, with diversified activities all over the world
in the steel industry in general and in the production of
seamless tubes in particular.
As well as the “birth” and “death” of enterprises
and the changes in market structure and performance
–including the privatization of a State-owned steelworks
and the total disappearance of the State as an important
agent in this market– changes were also taking place
1. The empirical evidence
In almost all sectors of production, firms which could
not adapt to the new rules have disappeared, new firms
have entered the market, bringing with them new
technologies (products, processes and organization of
work), and there have been changes –sometimes of a
radical nature– in the institutional and regulatory
framework in which the sector operates (changes in
patent law, property rights over natural resources, fiscal
treatment, etc.). At the same time, the degree of
economic concentration has increased and in each
market the competition from foreign firms has also
become stronger. Firms have reduced their degree of
vertical integration and have moved towards just-in-
time production organization techniques, interacting
in a very different way with the international
environment.
All this suggests that in each field of production a
new production organization model has emerged, i.e.,
a new way of creating economic surplus and distributing
it among the different economic agents and also
between the local economy and the foreign sector. This
is exactly what economic globalization means: that the
different sectoral technological and competitive regimes
become more closely linked with external forces.
Let us take as an example the steel industry –ISIC
371 (iron and steel)–, in which Argentina, Colombia
and Brazil are clearly coming closer to the international
technological frontier, while Chile and Mexico are also
doing well, though rather less spectacularly. In other
words, all the countries studied here managed to
improve their position relative to the United States in
this field during the period under examination. To what
was this due? The failure of the United States in the
iron and steel field throughout the 1980s was
undoubtedly very serious and is well documented in
the literature of the 1970s and 1980s, highlighting the
enormous difficulty experienced by the United States
steel companies in keeping up with the rate of
innovation of their European or South Korean
competitors. This obviously cannot be the whole
explanation for what happened, however. What we are
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in the institutional structure, in the mechanisms for the
training of skilled human resources, and in the creation
of new technological knowledge within the industry,
along with a marked change in the pattern of
comparative advantages and of insertion in world trade.
Techint S.A. made progress in the establishment of a
world-class research and development infrastructure,
acquired railways and ports, began to participate in
energy production, and was gradually building up a new
business management model which was younger and
more professionalized than that which had previously
characterized the sector. As it grew, it quite naturally
became linked with the exterior more than with the
domestic environment. As it became a global player it
gradually left behind its past as an import substitution
firm and steadily took on characteristics of present-day
capitalism. Its former image belonged to the
international climate of the post-war years, while its
new image belongs to the competitive world of
globalization.
This completes our description of the example of
the steel industry, which we now intend to use as the
basis for an exercise in “appreciative theorization”.
Generalizing on the basis of this case, we can say that
all forms of productive activity may be seen as an
aggregate of firms (public and private), regulatory
agencies, and rules and standards of behaviour which,
together, define a “competitive and technological
regime”, unique and particular in many respects, which
is different from that prevailing in other sectors of
production. This regime fits in with the global pattern
of incentives prevailing in society, but it also depends
on the specificities that each production sector has
developed over time and, ultimately, on the nature of
the individual actors participating in it. Comparative
advantages and forms of globalization do not only
reflect relative prices but also institutional factors,
business strategies and the technological changes that
the international production frontier undergoes
exogenously. Among the institutions involved are the
banks and financial agents which provide resources to
finance the long-term investment programmes of the
sector. There are also the universities and technical
schools responsible for training the human capital
required by industry, the engineering firms which
support the technical management of enterprises,
customs services, ports, and firms that supply energy
and transport services. In one way or another, each of
these links conditions the day-to-day operation of the
sector. This “collection” of actors “stores up” a whole
range of technological know-how, legal frameworks and
rules of behaviour which determine the greater or lesser
degree of efficiency attained by the sector at any given
moment in time. When we say that competitiveness is
systemic, this is exactly what we mean: in order to be
efficient, a production sector must operate in a context
which is efficient globally.
The recent structural reforms have affected the
systemic competitiveness of the whole structure of
production through the changes they have brought
about in the structure and performance of the multiple
sectoral regimes and in their linkages with domestic
and external institutional, economic and technological
forces. Each line of production, including its firms, its
technological know-how, its institutional framework
and its degree of internationalization, tends to change
as a function of the changes in the global system of
incentives prevailing in society. Only a proper
understanding of the way this takes in each sectoral
and national context will enable us to understand the
new forms of operation of Latin American capitalism
of recent years.
2. The forces behind changes in sectoral
regimes
a) “Birth” and “death” of enterprises
A first important topic related with the impact that the
structural reforms have had on almost all types of
production activities is that of the death and
disappearance of enterprises, on the one hand, and the
entry of new firms into the market on the other. Thus,
when the economy is opened up to outside competition
some firms are forced to leave the market because they
are unable to adapt to the new rules of the game, while
new firms may enter the market in their place. Such
births and deaths may take place at very different points
in time, that is to say, in very different phases of each
sector’s adaptation to the new rules. An important role
is played in this respect both by the relations between
micro and macro variables and by the changes which
take place simultaneously, but independently of each
other, in the institutional environment of each sector. A
macro economy with a high degree of uncertainty does
not stimulate the creation of new industrial plants. A
procyclical institutional situation, on the other hand
–for example, one that favours long-term investment
through suitable reorganization of the capital market–
can help to foster the installation of new production
capacity.
We can see from table 8 that the Argentine
steelworks which have disappeared have mostly been
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TABLE 8
Argentina: Structural change, “births” and “deaths of
companies in the steel industry, 1975-1992
1975 1980 1985 1990 1992
Integrated firms Alt. Horn. Zapla Alt. Horn. Zapla Alt. Horn. Zapla Alt. Horn. Zapla Aceros Zapla
Somisa Somisa Somisa Somisa Aceros Paraná
Acindar Acindar Acindar Acindar
Siderca Siderca Siderca Siderca
Total 2 4 4 4 4
Semi-integrated firms Aceros Bragado Aceros Bragado Aceros Bragado Aceros Bragado Aceros Bragado
Aceros Ohler Gurmendi Tamet Tamet
Acinda La Cantábrica







Total 10 5 2 2 1
Total rolling mills 47 38 36 33 21
Total, whole industry 59 47 42 39 26
Source:  Azpiazu and Basualdo (1997).
small and medium-sized non-integrated enterprises, and
they have mostly disappeared in the early stages of the
country’s macroeconomic adjustment process.11 In
contrast, the “births” seem to take place in later stages
of the cycle, when the macro economy entered on a
stage of stabilization and business expectations once
again favoured longer-term investment processes and
technological modernization programmes.
Apart from the question of the point in time at
which the births and deaths of enterprises take place,
we can also see that the process has a clear impact on
the average size of the plants in the industry, on labour
productivity, and on the index of economic
concentration prevailing in the activity. This is shown
in stylized form in figure 4. The vertical axis measures
the average productivity of the branch, while the
horizontal axis shows the average size of the plants.
The first distribution describes the situation of the
industry before the opening of the economy, while the
second one represents the industry after trade
liberalization has taken place.
We note that the improvements in average
productivity are due both to the deaths –which we may
assume to correspond to the smaller and more inefficient
enterprises of the sector– and to the births, which we
may assume to be associated with the entry into the
market of new firms of larger average size which bring
with them production and organizational technologies
much closer to the international “state of the art”.
The sectoral restructuring process we have been
describing is associated with an increase in the degree
of economic concentration, but also probably with a
reduction in the index of relative heterogeneity among
plants within the sector. The increase in economic
concentration in the sector should not necessarily be
seen as an indication that the degree of monopoly is
increasing, however. It should be remembered that,
along with the restructuring of the sector, the opening
up of the economy is increasing the disciplinary effect
11
 The weakness of local anti-monopoly legislation may be viewed
as part of the institutional situation in which the restructuring of
this industry takes place. Techint S.A. bought and then closed down
several of the small and medium-sized steelworks which
disappeared from the market in the 1980s. An institutional situation
which was firmer as far as the protection of competition was
concerned would assuredly have given rise to a different type of
restructuring of the sector from that which finally occurred in this
branch of production.
145C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 1
SECTORAL REGIMES,  PRODUCTIVITY AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETIT IVENESS  •  JORGE KATZ AND GIOVANNI  STUMPO
on the other to the gradual externalization of the sources
of technological progress underlying the increases in
productivity.
The privatization of public enterprises has operated
in the same direction in recent years –i.e., lowering the
average age of the stock of capital goods and facilitating
the expulsion of skilled labour (as for example in the
telecommunications or energy sectors). In a number of
countries of the region, there has even been a tendency
in these sectors to close down the engineering and
project design departments which State enterprises had
created during the import substitution years. A similar
process seems to be taking place in many local
subsidiaries of big transnational groups, which in recent
years have started to operate in real time, working “on
line” with their respective headquarters. Many of them
have radically changed their past forms of production
organization and technological behaviour. It now seems
less necessary to them to adapt technology to the local
environment as they did in the past; the proportion of
imported inputs used in production has increased and
there has been a transition towards a strategy of almost
total assimilation of the range of products manufactured
locally with those of the parent firm.12
In all these cases we are faced with the paradox
that while progress is being made towards product
designs and production technologies which are closer
to the world technological frontier, at the same time
there is a growing trend towards the assembly of
imported components, with less domestic value added.
In a recent study, Cimoli and Katz (2001) illustrate
this phenomenon through a model which is summarized
in figure 5. In quadrant 1 we have a transformation
function with two production factors: domestic capital
(KD) and foreign capital (KF). The curves in this
quadrant show the various combinations of machinery
and equipment, of local and imported origin, that firms
can choose at different relative prices. The relation
between the use of foreign capital and the expulsion of
human resources observed in the plants is shown in
quadrant 2. Quadrant 4 describes the relation between
the use of foreign capital and imports. Curve FF
represents a neutral response to prices on international
markets. A movement towards the abscissa will restrict
imports of capital goods. If the curve moves in the
opposite direction, however, there will be more
incentives for the importation of such goods.
of outside competition on local firms, making it harder
for them to capture monopoly rents. This effect will
undoubtedly differ a great deal between branches of
activity, however, depending on the greater or lesser
role, in each case, that brand names, patent rights and
other such “institutions” play in strengthening the
capacity of firms to differentiate their products from
imported ones. An extreme example of this is the case
of the pharmaceutical industry, where consumers
display various forms of “loyalty” to brand names and
imperfect information of the consumer is a proverbial
feature of the industrial organization model of the
sector. This has enabled pharmaceutical entrepreneurs
to capture monopoly rents even in the context of trade
liberalization (Katz, 1998). This obviously does not
apply, however, to less differentiated products which
are more in the nature of “commodities”.
b) Rejuvenation of the stock of machinery and
equipment and displacement of local engineering
services
The fact that imported capital goods have become
cheaper because of greater trade openness has favoured
their use instead of locally-made machinery and
equipment, and the same thing has happened with
respect to local engineering services, which were
previously used in-plant to extend the life cycle of the
available equipment. In other words, the structural
reforms designed to increase competitiveness have led
on the one hand to a certain degree of rejuvenation of
the machinery and equipment available in industry, and
12





Births and deaths of enterprises and average




Average size of plants
M =  Average productivity of sector before trade liberalization efforts
M1 = Average productivity of sector after trade liberalization
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A fall in the relative price of imported capital goods
compared with locally-made ones (as a result, for
example, of a reduction in import tariffs) will cause a
movement from A to B. In general, using more
machines means that less labour will be needed, but as
the imported equipment “embodies” some of the skills
of local skilled labour, its importation will also mean
that fewer skilled human resources are needed in-plant.
Furthermore, some maintenance efforts which were
previously made in order to extend the life cycle of the
machinery also become unnecessary because of the
greater accessibility and lower price of imported
equipment. It makes less sense than before to maintain
engineering departments of the size previously
considered to correspond with the scale and level of
activity of the plants, so that many of them are simply
eliminated. Curve T in quadrant 3 represents the
solution of the model: greater imports of capital goods
due to the reduction in their relative prices leads to the
expulsion of human capital.
The figure also shows a situation in which the
foreign capital incorporates a much better “vintage” of
technology, causing the curve in quadrant 1 to shift
towards the root. This means that the same level of
production can be achieved with fewer (imported)
machines than before. If more machinery is imported
than is needed to manufacture the original amount of
output, the displacement of skilled labour from the plant
will result even larger. Curve T will shift to T’,
indicating that the same amount of expulsion of human
resources can be achieved with fewer imports of
machines. If output increases with respect to the initial
output, the “destruction” of local human capital will
be even greater.
In an open economy the life cycle of machinery
tends to be shorter, the rate of obsolescence higher
and the replacement of equipment faster than in an
economy which is less open, where importing
machinery is more expensive and more difficult
(because of non-tariff restrictions). This brings in an
important new phenomenon: as the production of
technological know-how does not constitute part of
the local comparative advantages, firms will
increasingly resort to the importation of technological
knowledge “embodied” in new equipment, instead of
using locally-produced machinery and engineering
services. In these circumstances, it will be more
difficult to build up local technological capacity, and
this situation becomes even worse when, because of
the privatization of State enterprises and the
gradual transition to internationally integrated
systems of production in large MNCs, engineering
and pro jec t  p lanning  ac t iv i t ies  tend  to  be
transferred to the head offices of the parent firms.
In the new pattern of production specialization
resulting from mergers or from the privatization
of public companies, the local firms tend to
concentrate on tasks involving less local added
value. They choose to operate closer to assembly
activities or the primary processing of natural
resources than to engage in processes with a higher
local added value (Cimoli and Katz, 2001).
This phenomenon also has implications for the
trade balance, as we see in section d below.
On the other hand, just as there is some evidence
of forces associated with the sectoral restructuring
process described above which can destroy domestic
technological capacity, there is also evidence that that
process leads to the appearance of new activities (for
example, production services such as packaging,
development of computer programmes, real-time
transport and distribution services, international
marketing, etc.) which involve a gradual transition
towards a more sophisticated technological and
competitive regime closer to the international “state of
the art”.
In short, sectoral restructuring is intimately
associated with a process of creative destruction of both
the physical and human capital linked with a given
sectoral regime.
FIGURE 5
Lowering of cost of imported capital goods
and obsolescence of local human capital
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c) The restructuring of institutions
The process described above has a clear parallel in the
institutional sphere, where different forms of partial
approximation to the model of production organization
of the developed countries may also be noticed. The
strengthening of property rights in the field of natural
resources (some countries have even incorporated these
rights in their Constitutions), the deregulation of many
markets (capital and labour markets, for example),
stronger intellectual property rights, and the assurance
by law that foreign capital will receive the same
treatment as domestic capital all form part of a broad
network of new institutions which represents a gradual
process of “levelling the playing field”, as this is
sometimes called today.
The changes in the international agenda in this
respect began to take shape in the mid-1980s and were
connected on the one hand with the 1984 United States
Trade and Tariff Act and on the other with the initiation
in 1986 of the multilateral negotiations on intellectual
property rights, which finally resulted in the TRIPS
(Trade-Related aspects of International Property Rights)
agreement of the Uruguay Round of GATT, signed in
Marrakesh in 1994.13 It was precisely from that time
onward that the process of institutional convergence
towards the new set of disciplines (TRIPS, TRIMS (Trade-
Related Investment Measures) and GATS (General
Agreement on Trade in Services) began to gather pace.
In a recent study, Sercovich holds that the commitment
to institutional convergence is undeniable. Of the 109
developing countries and transitional economies which
have undergone pro-competitive reforms since the
1980s, 75 did so from 1989 onwards. Furthermore, 107
of the 134 members of the WTO are developing or
transitional economies, while 28 –including China, the
Russian Federation and Taiwan– are actively
negotiating their entry under special conditions. The
TRIMS agreement provides that by 2002 the developing
countries must abolish all restrictions on foreign
investment which affect, among other things, export
subsidies and local content requirements (Sercovich,
1999).
In short, the restructuring of the sectoral
technological and competitive regimes we have been
describing involves not only a complex episode of
changes in the structure and performance of each
sector of production –through births and deaths of
enterprises, increases in the degree of economic
concentration, etc.– but also profound changes in the
institutional and regulatory environment in which each
activity operates.
d) Linkages with the external sector
The changes in the global incentives regime prevailing
in society also cause the relationship with external
forces and linkages to change in a dramatic way.
In view of the changes in relative prices that take
place in the economy as a result of trade liberalization,
the greater degree of vertical disintegration now
observed in production processes and the increasingly
important role played by MNCs operating under
integrated international production systems, it may be
expected that many inputs that were previously made
locally (or subcontracted to local firms) are now
imported. In order to import them it becomes necessary
to export more. In other words, it would seem
reasonable to expect that the new technological and
competitive regimes will give rise to a greater
orientation towards the exterior in terms of both imports
and exports. It also seems reasonable to expect that there
will be big differences in the way each industry
restructures its pattern of linkages with the exterior. We
know, for example, that industrial sectors which make
intensive use of technological knowledge and research
–such as the pharmaceutical, electronics or capital
goods sectors– have found it more efficient, when tariff
protection was reduced, to go back to buying
intermediate inputs and raw materials from their
respective parent firms instead of continuing to produce
them locally. We also know that in order to be able to
import those intermediate inputs many firms have been
obliged to export (or have been pressed to do so by the
economic authorities, as in the case of the motor
industry).
13
 The “Statement of Views of the European, Japanese and United
States Business Communities” issued in June 1988 as a preparatory
base of GATT on intellectual property rights says: Inappropriate and
ineffective protection of intellectual property rights has given rise
to serious distortions in international trade ….. [those] rights form
the basis for international competitiveness …..”. Much of the
explanation for the changes which have taken place in the
international agenda during those years may be found in the political
lobbying carried out in Washington by the United States
pharmaceutical industry, whose international competitiveness was
seriously affected by the weakness of patent legislation in countries
such as Argentina, Brazil or India. See in this respect Olson (1991)
and, with regard to pharmaceutical matters in general and the
erosion of the United States’ comparative advantages because of
the slower rate of innovation of its pharmaceutical industry in the
1970s, see Katz (1974).
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In other words, the change in the production
organization model (vertical disintegration), the
tendency to operate under the form of integrated
international production systems, tariff reductions,
government pressures or contraction in domestic
demand have caused the new technological and
competitive regimes to be “naturally” more linked with
the exterior than before. This brings with it the
possibility that those regimes may involve foreign
exchange deficits, i.e., that they may generate deficits
on their external trade balances. This gives rise to an
important new issue of micro-macro coordination: a
global trade balance seems increasingly difficult to
sustain under present circumstances.
The following tables show that this is actually
taking place, though some countries seem to be more
affected than others by these new trends.
The evidence shows that the transition to more open
sectoral regimes has been much stronger in Mexico than
in the other countries. The role of the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the pressure that may be
expected from operating in increasingly close
integration with the world’s largest economy –which
also kept up a rapid growth rate throughout almost the
whole of the decade– undoubtedly explain the big
increase in both the import and export coefficients in
the case of Mexico, especially after the devaluation in
late 1994. We can also see that, although both indexes
increased considerably, the new sectoral regimes in
Mexico were more oriented towards exports than
imports, which represents a major difference with the
cases of Argentina, Brazil or Colombia.
This explains (table 10) why Mexico achieved a
positive trade balance in the manufacturing sector from
1991 on. In contrast, although MERCOSUR has given
rise to considerable increases in intra-regional trade, its
impact on the degree of external openness of the new
sectoral competitive regimes of Argentina, Brazil or
Colombia has been significantly less than in the case of
Mexico and there has been a stronger orientation towards
imports, reflected in significant trade balance deficits. As
our reasoning earlier shows, this deficit has been
particularly marked in those industries making intensive
use of technological and engineering services and research
and development, i.e., those manufacturing capital goods,
electronic goods and pharmaceutical inputs. As we argued
earlier, in all these cases the new sectoral regimes have
tended to cause a disproportionate increase in their demand
for imports. Their revealed competitiveness has clearly
fallen further behind after trade liberalization.
The data show a clear deterioration in the trade
balance during the 1990s, except for Mexico. Brazil
TABLE 9
Latin America (five countries): Export and
import coefficients of the manufacturing sector
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999
Argentina
Export coefficient 7.6 6.0 16.0 17.1 16.8
Import coefficient 10.3 11.3 6.8 30.7 27.6
Brazil
Export coefficient 7.3 9.1 7.7 10.2 13.6
Import coefficient 8.4 7.1 4.8 13.0 15.3
Mexico
Export coefficient 3.4 2.9 9.5 42.0 51.7
Import coefficient 9.7 15.1 17.8 45.2 49.4
Chile
Export coefficient 3.2 10.2 13.2 15.8 17.5
Import coefficient 21.0 30.1 34.3 44.0 35.8
Colombia
Export coefficient 2.9 6.6 10.1 13.8
Import coefficient 22.9 22.4 24.0 42.4
Source:  The PADI computer programme.
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TABLE 10
Latin America (five countries): Trade balance of the manufacturing
sector as a whole and the sectors making intensive use of technology
Trade balance
Countries
1970 1980 1990 1998 1999
Argentina
Sectors making intensive use of technology -519.89 -4 214.3 -649.82 -13 050.1 -10 357.00
Manufacturing sector as a whole -382.4 -4 237.21 4 592.41 -13 107.8 -9 431.69
Brazil
Sectors making intensive use of technology -1 051.16 -2 136.85 -947.89 -15 855.5 -12 194.50
Manufacturing sector as a whole -291.13 3 478.45 9 252.51 -10 918.3 -4 607.14
Mexico
Sectors making intensive use of technology -1 201.92 -8 237.65 -6 800.07 5 894.14 22 143.48
Manufacturing sector as a whole -1 404.33 -13 193.1 -11 912.3 -7 929.67 6 327.72
Chile
Sectors making intensive use of technology -437.74 -1 804.3 -3 272.27 -7 664.89 -5 188.14
Manufacturing sector as a whole -643.29 -2 357.18 -3 439.62 -9 470.48 -5 790.67
Colombia
Sectors making intensive use of technology -419.61 -1 793.25 -2 205.66 -6 105.21 -3 876.11
Manufacturing sector as a whole -677.89 -2 626.78 -2 810.82 -8 912.3 -5 403.23
Source:  The PADI computer programme.
a
  The corresponding sectors are:
01  Sectors making intensive use of engineering services, except the motor industry (ISIC 381, 382, 383, 385).
02  Motor industry (ISIC 384).
03  Total for sectors making intensive use of engineering services (01 + 02).
04  Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (ISIC 311, 313, 314).
05  Other sectors making intensive use of natural resources (ISIC 331, 341, 351, 354, 355, 362, 369, 371, 372).
06  Total for sectors making intensive use of natural resources (04 + 05).
07  Sectors making intensive use of labour (ISIC 321, 322, 323, 324, 332, 342, 352, 356, 361, 390).
08  Total for manufacturing.
TABLE 11
Latin America (five countries): Import coefficients
Argentina Brazil Mexico
Sectorsa 1970 1980 1990 1998 1999 1970 1980 1990 1999 1970 1980 1990 1999
0.1 28.3 33.3 21.4 126.0 112.8 22.9 13.6 10.1 36.6 26.1 32.3 42.9 105.5
02 5.3 11.7 6.1 43.7 33.3 11.8 9.3 3.6 22.2 25.2 25.6 23.3 32.7
03 17.8 23.5 14.8 77.0 65.5 19.0 12.3 8.0 31.6 25.8 29.8 34.2 72.7
04 0.8 1.6 0.4 3.2 3.0 1.5 1.8 2.2 3.0 1.4 5.5 7.4 7.3
05 23.9 14.9 10.6 28.8 27.0 12.3 9.6 5.5 14.3 10.7 19.0 17.5 52.9
06 10.0 6.9 5.0 13.7 12.9 6.7 6.7 4.1 8.9 5.1 11.7 12.1 26.4
07 3.8 7.5 4.0 26.4 27.4 2.2 1.7 2.1 9.2 4-0 4.5 9.4 43.0
08 10.3 11.3 6.8 30.7 27.6 8.4 7.1 4.8 15.3 9-7 15.1 17.8 49.4
Chile Colombia
Sectorsa 1970 1980 1990 1998 1999 1970 1980 1990 1998
01 65.9 102.3 151.3 187.0 157.3 79.0 82.2 97.9 158.3
02 47.5 133.4 151.7 211.0 142.6 112.4 64.1 44.2 98.7
03 59.6 111.8 151.4 192.3 154.3 88.8 75.6 76.9 136.2
04 6.7 10.4 3.8 7.2 6.7 2.5 4.7 2.5 8.8
05 20.9 24.3 32.4 33.6 28.1 40.4 36.8 42.1 56.9
06 12.9 15.7 15.4 18.1 15.4 15.5 16.4 18.6 27.5
07 6.8 17.4 16.3 34.2 33.0 6.3 5.8 6.5 20.6
08 21.0 30.1 34.3 44.0 35.8 22.9 22.4 24.0 42.4
Source:  The PADI computer programme.
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and Argentina went from surpluses to deficits,
which grew up to 1997-1998. After the latter year
the external sector shows improvements but this due
to a drastic fall in the demand for imports (in
Argentina, Chile and Colombia) and to devaluation
of the local currency. In these four countries imports
went down in 1999 compared with the previous year
(the declines in nominal values were 19% for
Argentina, 17% for Brazil, 25% for Chile and 28%
for Colombia), while exports also went down in
nominal values in the case of Argentina, Brazil and
Colombia and increased slightly in the case of
Chile.
In Mexico, the trade balance situation is different
as a result of the strong increase in exports, which more
than offset the also considerable rise in imports.
A more disaggregated analysis of the import
coefficients (table 11) shows their impressive increase in
the 1990s, which was concentrated primarily in the sectors
producing capital goods and consumer durables (electronic
goods, computer-related products and household
appliances. The fall in domestic demand in the late 1990s
reduced these coefficients in 1999 and thus lowered the
trade deficit in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Brazil.
The improvement in Mexico’s trade balance was due rather
to an increase in that country’s export capacity.
IV
Conclusions
The transition from an inward-oriented, State-led
development model to another model which is more
open to trade and deregulated –in which the “hidden
hand” of markets plays a leading role in guiding
resource allocation– has given rise in the different
countries of the region to new patterns of production
specialization and insertion in world markets for goods
and services. This has taken place in the context of a
Schumpeterian episode of “creative destruction” in
which one model of social organization of production
and institutional and technological behaviour was
gradually displaced by another one, through the joint
and interdependent action of economic, technological
and institutional forces.
In previous pages we have shown that big changes
have effectively been taking place in the pattern of
production specialization and the form of insertion in
world trade, so that two new “dominant” models have
taken shape in the region as a whole. On the one hand,
there is the “maquila” or assembly-based model,
centered in Mexico and various small Central American
countries, while on the other there is the model based
on the processing of natural resources, which
characterizes Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, and
various Andean countries such as Colombia and Peru.
Obviously, in order to understand the details of this
process of change we must leave the macro sphere and
descend to the mesoeconomic and microeconomic
levels, since it is there that the changes in the dominant
production organization model have taken place. There
have been changes in the relative participation of
different types of firms – local subsidiaries of
transnational groups, locally-owned conglomerates, and
small and medium-sized family owned enterprises – as
well as in the sources of economic growth of each type
of production activity. New patterns of microeconomic
behaviour have also been growing up in which imported
capital goods and intermediate inputs have been
displacing both their local production and the local
technological efforts associated with their creation. A
new production model has thus been taking shape which
is more closely linked with the exterior than in the past.
Export-led growth does not seem to be as automatic
as is sometimes assumed in the current debates,
however. Our data clearly show that the process of
growth and economic restructuring of the 1990s is
raising a number of new and quite complex problems
which, if not solved, can seriously compromise the
growth prospects of the countries of the region.
It should be emphasized in this respect that not
only were there very few countries in the region which
have managed to improve their international
competitiveness in the 1990s, but also this has only
happened in a few production activities. These were
mostly maquila industries making intensive use of
unskilled labour and oriented basically to the United
States market, or industries processing natural
resources.
This is reflected in the weak relative performance
labour productivity has exhibited as compared with the
151C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 5  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 1
SECTORAL REGIMES,  PRODUCTIVITY AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETIT IVENESS  •  JORGE KATZ AND GIOVANNI  STUMPO
United States: although almost all the countries
registered a substantial increase in labour productivity
in manufacturing in absolute terms in the 1990s, only
in a very few cases (basically Argentina and Brazil)
was that increase greater than in the United States and
–what was worse– in no case did it recover the absolute
levels of relative productivity of the early 1970s.
These weaknesses of the new economic model are
clearly reflected in the trade deficits, which are mostly due
to the technologically more complex activities. Moreover,
these deficits tend to increase in the upswing of the cycle
and tend to go down in periods of sharp recession.
The complexity of these problems leads to the
conclusion that a great deal remains to be done in terms
of economic policy. A number of countries of the region
have begun to perceive this, and in recent years they
have been abandoning strictly orthodox rules in order
to begin exploring a new agenda of public actions
through which to improve their long-term productivity
and competitive performance.
On the basis of the above diagnosis, we suggest
that important areas for future government involvement
are: i) regulatory environments and consumer
protection; ii) competition policies; iii) measures to
promote production and technological development,
and iv) interventions aiming at “constructing” synergies
and externalities at the local levels. In each of these
four spheres there are obvious “market failures”,
asymmetries of information, exploitation of dominant
market positions by MNCs and other such “anomalies”
that would justify the design and implementation of
institutional measures aimed at constructing markets
and knowledge-based dynamic comparative advantages
that would favour a more efficient (and equitable)
transition to open and competitive economies. Each of
these topics would, of course, demand extensive
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